Talos Vulnerability Report

Summary

An exploitable SQL injection vulnerability exists in ‘manageServiceStocks.jsp’ page of OpenClinic GA 5.173.3. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to SQL injection. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.

Tested Versions

OpenClinic GA 5.173.3

Product URLs

https://sourceforge.net/projects/open-clinic/

CVSSv3 Score

6.4 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CWE

CWE-89 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (‘SQL Injection’)

Details

OpenClinic GA is an open source fully integrated hospital management solution.

FindServiceUid parameter in manageServiceStocks.jsp page is vulnerable to authenticated SQL injection. The following request would trigger the vulnerability:

POST /openclinic/main.do?Page=pharmacy/manageServiceStocks.jsp&ts=1603981647838 HTTP/1.1
Referer: http://[IP]:10080/openclinic/main.do?Page=pharmacy/manageServiceStocks.jsp&ts=1603981646619
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/70.0.3538.102 Safari/537.36   
Edge/18.18362
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Length: 750
Host: [IP]:10080
Cookie: JSESSIONID=C3AEAECEA33285FCCE9E02171E8B3FA1
Connection: close

FindStockName=&FindServiceUid=  

    

SQLINJECTION>&FindServiceName=&FindBegin=&FindEnd=&FindManagerUid=&FindManagerName=&FindDefaultSupplierUid=&FindDefault
SupplierNameNametEnd=EditManagerUid=4&EditManagerName=test&AuthorizedUserIdAdd=&AuthorizedUserNameAdd=&EditAuthorized
Users=&ReceivingUserIdAdd=&ReceicingUserNameAdd=&EditReceivingUsers=&DispensingUserIdAdd=&DispensingUserNameAdd=&Edit   t   
DispensingUsers=&ValidationUserIdAdd=&ValidationUserNameAdd=&EditValidtionUsers=&EditDefaultSupplierUid=is &EditOrderPeriodIn
Months=1&EditNosync=1&EditHidden=1&EditValidateOutgoing=1&Action=find&EditStockUid=-1&DisplaySearchFields=false&DisplayActive
ServiceStocks=

The above vulnerability is triggered due to dynamic use of FindServiceUid paremter when the find action is invoked as seen below:

 //--- FIND ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
if(sAction.startsWith("find")){
    displayActiveServiceStocks = false;
    displayEditFields = false;
    displayFoundRecords = true;

    if(sAction.equals("findShowOverview")){
        displaySearchFields = true;
    }

    // get data from form
    sFindStockName          = checkString(request.getParameter("FindStockName"));
    sFindBegin              = checkString(request.getParameter("FindBegin"));
    sFindEnd                = checkString(request.getParameter("FindEnd"));
    sFindManagerUid         = checkString(request.getParameter("FindManagerUid"));
    sFindServiceUid         = checkString(request.getParameter("FindServiceUid"));
    sFindDefaultSupplierUid = checkString(request.getParameter("FindDefaultSupplierUid"));

    Vector serviceStocks = ServiceStock.find(sFindStockName,sFindServiceUid,sFindBegin,sFindEnd,
                                             sFindManagerUid,sFindDefaultSupplierUid,"OC_STOCK_NAME","ASC");
    stocksHtml =  objectsToHtml(serviceStocks,sWebLanguage,activeUser,request.getParameter("showhidden"),bHasActivePrescriptions,request.getParameter("showunauthorized"));
    foundStockCount = serviceStocks.size();

In the function call to ServiceStock.find, an SQL query is created and, eventually, executed when the function below is called in the be.openclinic.pharmacy.SeviceStock class:

public static Vector find(String sFindStockName, String sFindServiceUid, String sFindBegin, String sFindEnd, String sFindManagerUid,   
String sFindDefaultSupplierUid, String sSortCol, String sSortDir)
  {
	Vector foundObjects = new Vector();
	PreparedStatement ps = null;
	ResultSet rs = null;

	Connection oc_conn = MedwanQuery.getInstance().getOpenclinicConnection();
	try {
	  String sSelect = "SELECT OC_STOCK_SERVERID, OC_STOCK_OBJECTID FROM OC_SERVICESTOCKS";

	  if ((sFindStockName.length() > 0) || (sFindServiceUid.length() > 0) || (sFindBegin.length() > 0) || 
		(sFindEnd.length() > 0) || (sFindManagerUid.length() > 0) || (sFindDefaultSupplierUid.length() > 0)) {
		sSelect = sSelect + " WHERE ";
		if (sFindServiceUid.length() > 0)
		{
		  Vector childIds = Service.getChildIds(sFindServiceUid);
		  childIds.add(sFindServiceUid);

		  String sChildIds = ScreenHelper.tokenizeVector(childIds, ",", "'");
		  if (sChildIds.length() > 0) {
			sSelect = sSelect + "OC_STOCK_SERVICEUID IN (" + sChildIds + ") AND ";
		  }
		  else {
			sSelect = sSelect + "OC_STOCK_SERVICEUID IN ('') AND ";
		  }

Timeline

2020-11-19 - Initial contact
2020-12-07 - 2nd contact; copy of advisories issued and vendor acknowledged receipt
2021-02-01 - 60 day follow up; no response
2021-03-09 - 90 day follow up; no response
2021-03-22 - Final notice
2021-04-13 - Public disclosure