CVE-2021-40407,CVE-2021-40408, CVE-2021-40409, CVE-2021-40410,CVE-2021-40411,CVE-2021-40412
Multiple os command injection vulnerabilities exist in the device network settings functionality of reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102. A specially-crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send an HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
Reolink RLC-410W v3.0.0.136_20121102
RLC-410W - https://reolink.com/us/product/rlc-410w/
9.1 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (‘OS Command Injection’)
The Reolink RLC-410W is a WiFi security camera. The camera includes motion detection functionalities and various methods to save the recordings.
The RLC-410W exposes some privileged APIs to setup different networking parameters, like: DDNS, DNS, IP, Hostname, etc.
The device program is responsible for taking the change, through the APIs, and applying those into the system. These change are implemented using OS commands. Because these inputs are not validated properly, this lead to OS command injections.
The API that allows the manipulation of the DDNS settings is SetDdns, and the payload for changing the data looks like:
[
{
"cmd": "SetDdns",
"action": 0,
"param": {
"Ddns": {
"domain": <DOMAIN>,
"enable": <ENABLE>,
"password": <PASSWORD>,
"type": <TYPE>,
"userName": <USERNAME>
}
}
}
]
From the API program, this information will be saved into a settings file and eventually used by the device program. Specifically the function that applies the DDNS settings is set_dds_config:
undefined4 set_dds_config(ddns_data_struct *ddns)
{
[...]
memset(ddns_shell_command,0,0x100);
memset(ddns_type,0,0x80);
memset(username_and_password,0,0x400);
memset(b64_encoded,0,0x400);
if (ddns == (ddns_data_struct *)0x0) {
return 0xffffffff;
}
type_of_ddns = ddns->type_of_ddns;
if (type_of_ddns == 3) {
[...]
GOTO_FORMAT:
pip_system(ddns_format_string);
ddns_format_string = "/mnt/tmp/ddns/ddns-config %s %s %s %s %d %s";
}
else {
if (type_of_ddns != 0) {
if (type_of_ddns != 1) {
if (type_of_ddns == 4) {
if (((ddns->domain[0] == 0) && (ddns->username[0] == 0)) && (ddns->password[0] == 0)) {
return 0;
}
snprintf(username_and_password,0x3ff,"%s:%s",ddns->username,ddns->password);
username_and_password_len = strlen(username_and_password);
iVar1 = bencode(username_and_password,username_and_password_len,b64_encoded,0x400);
if (iVar1 < 0) {
return 0xffffffff;
}
strcpy(ddns_type,"dynupdate.no-ip.com");
if (ddns->ddns_server[0] == 0) {
strcpy((char *)ddns->ddns_server,"dynupdate.no-ip.com");
}
pip_system("rm /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun -f");
pip_system("ln -s /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun.noip /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun");
snprintf(ddns_shell_command,0x100,"/mnt/tmp/ddns/ddns-config %s %s %s %s %d %s %s ",
ddns->domain,ddns->username,ddns->password,ddns_type,1,ddns->ddns_server,
b64_encoded); [1]
}
else {
[...]
}
goto GOTO_SYSTEM;
}
if (((ddns->domain[0] == 0) && (ddns->username[0] == 0)) && (ddns->password[0] == 0)) {
return 0;
}
strcpy(ddns_type,"members.dyndns.org");
pip_system("rm /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun -f");
ddns_format_string = "ln -s /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun.dyndns /mnt/tmp/ddns/ddnsrun";
goto GOTO_FORMAT;
}
[...]
}
snprintf(ddns_shell_command,0x100,ddns_format_string,ddns->domain,ddns->username,ddns->password,
ddns_type,1,ddns->ddns_server); [2]
GOTO_SYSTEM:
if (ddns_shell_command[0] != '\0') {
pip_system(ddns_shell_command); [3]
}
pip_system("/mnt/tmp/ddns/ddns-start &");
return 0;
}
The pip_system is not much different from the system function.
The OS command string for changing the DDNS setting is prepared at [1] or [2], based the DDNS type, and then the prepared command is executed at [3].
The API that allows for the manipulation of the DNS settings is SetLocalLink, and the payload for changing the data looks like:
[
{
"cmd": "SetLocalLink",
"action": 0,
"param": {
"LocalLink": {
"dns": {
"auto": 0,
"dns1": <DNS1>,
"dns2": <DNS2>
},
"mac": <MAC>,
"static": {
"gateway": <GW_IP>,
"ip": <CAMERA_IP>,
"mask": <NETMASK>
},
"type": <TYPE>
}
}
}
]
From the API program, this information will be saved into a settings file and eventually used by the device program. Specifically the function that applies the DNS settings is bc_dns_set:
int bc_dns_set(char *interface,dns_data *dns_data)
{
int res;
char set_dns_shell_command [260];
if (*interface != '\0') {
memset(set_dns_shell_command,0,0x100);
if ((dns_data->dns1[0] == 0) && (dns_data->dns2[0] == 0)) {
pip_system("echo > /etc/resolv.conf");
res = 0;
}
else {
snprintf(set_dns_shell_command,0x100,"echo \"nameserver %s\" > /etc/resolv.conf",dns_data->dns1); [4]
res = pip_system(set_dns_shell_command); [5]
if (res < 0) {
res = -1;
}
else {
snprintf(set_dns_shell_command,0x100,"echo \"nameserver %s\" >> /etc/resolv.conf",
dns_data->dns2); [6]
res = pip_system(set_dns_shell_command); [7]
res = res >> 0x1f;
}
}
return res;
}
return -1;
}
At [4] the OS command string for the dns1 is prepared and then used at [5] to execute the command.
At [6] the OS command string for the dns2 is prepared and then used at [7] to execute the command.
The API that allows for the manipulation of the hostname is SetDevName, and the payload for changing the data looks like:
[
{
"cmd": "SetDevName",
"action": 0,
"param": {
"DevName": {
"name": <DEVICE_NAME>
}
}
}
]
From the API program, this information will be saved into a settings file and eventually used by the device program. Specifically the function that applies the DNS settings is bc_dhcpc_start:
int bc_dhcpc_start(char *interface,char *devname)
{
int is_error;
char dhcp_client_shell_command [256];
char requested_ip [16];
is_error = -1;
if ((*interface != '\0') && (*devname != '\0')) {
requested_ip._0_4_ = 0;
requested_ip._4_4_ = 0;
requested_ip._8_4_ = 0;
requested_ip._12_4_ = 0;
memset(dhcp_client_shell_command,0,0x100);
is_error = generate_IP(requested_ip);
if (-1 < is_error) {
snprintf(dhcp_client_shell_command,0x100,
"udhcpc -i %s -x hostname:\'%s\' -p /var/run/udhcpc.pid -r %s &",interface,devname,
requested_ip); [8]
is_error = pip_system(dhcp_client_shell_command); [9]
is_error = is_error >> 0x1f;
}
}
return is_error;
}
At [8] the OS command string for using the DHCP and setting the hostname is prepared and then used at [9] to execute the command.
All three of the APIs, SetDdns, SetLocalLink and SetDevName, can be used to reach the pip_system and exploit OS command injections. Their details are described below in dedicated sections.
At [1] or [2], based on DDNS type, the ddns->domain variable, that has the value of the domain parameter provided through the SetDdns API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [1] or [2] is then used as OS command at [3].
At [1] or [2], based on DDNS type, the ddns->username variable, that has the value of the userName parameter provided through the SetDdns API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [1] or [2] is then used as OS command at [3].
At [1] or [2], based on DDNS type, the ddns->password variable, that has the value of the password parameter provided through the SetDdns API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [1] or [2] is then used as OS command at [3].
At [4] the dns_data->dns1 variable, that has the value of the dns1 parameter provided through the SetLocalLink API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [4] is then used as OS command at [5].
At [6] the dns_data->dns2 variable, that has the value of the dns2 parameter provided through the SetLocalLink API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [6] is then used as OS command at [7].
At [8] the devname variable, that has the value of the name parameter provided through the SetDevName API, is not validated properly. This would lead to an OS command injection. The string formatted at [8] is then used as OS command at [9].
2021-12-06 - Vendor Disclosure
2022-01-19 - Vendor Patched
2022-01-26 - Public Release
Discovered by Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos.