CVE-2023-38651,CVE-2023-38650
Multiple integer overflow vulnerabilities exist in the VZT vzt_rd_block_vch_decode times parsing functionality of GTKWave 3.3.115. A specially crafted .vzt file can lead to memory corruption. A victim would need to open a malicious file to trigger these vulnerabilities.
The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.
GTKWave 3.3.115
GTKWave - https://gtkwave.sourceforge.net
7.0 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE-190 - Integer Overflow or Wraparound
GTKWave is a wave viewer, often used to analyze FPGA simulations and logic analyzer captures. It includes a GUI to view and analyze traces, as well as convert across several file formats (.lxt, .lxt2, .vzt, .fst, .ghw, .vcd, .evcd) either by using the UI or its command line tools. GTKWave is available for Linux, Windows and MacOS. Trace files can be shared within teams or organizations, for example to compare results of simulation runs across different design implementations, to analyze protocols captured with logic analyzers or just as a reference when porting design implementations.
GTKWave sets up mime types for its supported extensions. So, for example, it’s enough for a victim to double-click on a wave file received by e-mail to cause the gtkwave program to be executed and load a potentially malicious file.
VZT (Verilog Zipped Trace) files are parsed by the functions found in vzt_read.c. These functions are used in the vzt2vcd file conversion utility, vztminer, and by the GUI portion of GTKwave. Thus both are affected by the issue described in this report.
To parse VZT files, the function vzt_rd_init_smp is called:
struct vzt_rd_trace *vzt_rd_init_smp(const char *name, unsigned int num_cpus) {
[1] struct vzt_rd_trace *lt = (struct vzt_rd_trace *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct vzt_rd_trace));
...
[2] if (!(lt->handle = fopen(name, "rb"))) {
vzt_rd_close(lt);
lt = NULL;
} else {
vztint16_t id = 0, version = 0;
...
[3] if (!fread(&id, 2, 1, lt->handle)) {
id = 0;
}
if (!fread(&version, 2, 1, lt->handle)) {
id = 0;
}
if (!fread(<->granule_size, 1, 1, lt->handle)) {
id = 0;
}
...
At [1] the lt structure is initialized. This is the structure that will contain all the information about the input file.
The input file is opened [2] and 3 fields are read [3] to make sure the input file is a supported VZT file.
...
rcf = fread(<->numfacs, 4, 1, lt->handle);
[4] lt->numfacs = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->numfacs, 0) : 0;
...
rcf = fread(<->numfacbytes, 4, 1, lt->handle);
lt->numfacbytes = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->numfacbytes, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(<->longestname, 4, 1, lt->handle);
lt->longestname = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->longestname, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(<->zfacnamesize, 4, 1, lt->handle);
lt->zfacnamesize = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->zfacnamesize, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(<->zfacname_predec_size, 4, 1, lt->handle);
lt->zfacname_predec_size = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->zfacname_predec_size, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(<->zfacgeometrysize, 4, 1, lt->handle);
lt->zfacgeometrysize = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(<->zfacgeometrysize, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(<->timescale, 1, 1, lt->handle);
...
Several fields are then read from the file [4]:
numfacs: the number of facilities (elements in facnames)numfacbytes: unusedlongestname: keeps the longest length of all defined facilities’ nameszfacnamesize: compressed size of facnameszfacname_predec_size: decompressed size of facnameszfacgeometrysize: compressed size of facgeometryThen, the facnames and facgeometry structures are extracted. They can be compressed with either gzip, bzip2 or lzma, depending on the first 2 bytes within the structure buffer.
Right after these two structures, there’s a sequence of blocks that can be arbitrarily long.
for (;;) {
...
[5] b = calloc(1, sizeof(struct vzt_rd_block));
b->last_rd_value_idx = ~0;
[6] rcf = fread(&b->uncompressed_siz, 4, 1, lt->handle);
b->uncompressed_siz = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(&b->uncompressed_siz, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(&b->compressed_siz, 4, 1, lt->handle);
b->compressed_siz = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_32(&b->compressed_siz, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(&b->start, 8, 1, lt->handle);
b->start = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_64(&b->start, 0) : 0;
rcf = fread(&b->end, 8, 1, lt->handle);
b->end = rcf ? vzt_rd_get_64(&b->end, 0) : 0;
pos = ftello(lt->handle);
[7] if ((b->rle = (b->start > b->end))) {
vztint64_t tb = b->start;
b->start = b->end;
b->end = tb;
}
...
if ((b->uncompressed_siz) && (b->compressed_siz) && (b->end)) {
/* fprintf(stderr, VZT_RDLOAD"block [%d] %lld / %lld\n", lt->numblocks, b->start, b->end); */
fseeko(lt->handle, b->compressed_siz, SEEK_CUR);
lt->numblocks++;
if (lt->numblocks <= lt->pthreads) {
vzt_rd_pthread_mutex_init(lt, &b->mutex, NULL);
vzt_rd_decompress_blk_pth(lt, b); /* prefetch first block */
}
[8] if (lt->block_curr) {
b->prev = lt->block_curr;
lt->block_curr->next = b;
lt->block_curr = b;
lt->end = b->end;
} else {
lt->block_head = lt->block_curr = b;
lt->start = b->start;
lt->end = b->end;
}
} else {
free(b);
break;
}
pos += b->compressed_siz;
}
At [5] the block structure is initialized. At [6] some fields are extracted, and at [7] there’s a check to make sure that start is always smaller or equal to end (and sets rle if this isn’t true). Finally, the block is saved inside a linked list [8].
From this code we can see the file structure for a block as follows:
uncompressed_siz - unsigned big endian 32-bitcompressed_siz - unsigned big endian 32-bitstart_time - unsigned big endian 64-bitend_time - unsigned big endian 64-bitcompressed_sizUpon return from the current vzt_rd_init_smp function, the blocks are parsed inside vzt_rd_iter_blocks.
Eventually, a call to vzt_rd_decompress_blk decompresses the compressed contents of the block and sets b->mem to point to the contents of the decompressed data.
Once b->mem is set, we reach a call to vzt_rd_block_vch_decode that parses the compressed block contents.
static void vzt_rd_block_vch_decode(struct vzt_rd_trace *lt, struct vzt_rd_block *b) {
vzt_rd_pthread_mutex_lock(lt, &b->mutex);
if ((!b->times) && (b->mem)) {
vztint64_t *times = NULL;
vztint32_t *change_dict = NULL;
vztint32_t *val_dict = NULL;
unsigned int num_time_ticks, num_sections, num_dict_entries;
[9] unsigned char *pnt = b->mem;
vztint32_t i, j, m, num_dict_words;
/* vztint32_t *block_end = (vztint32_t *)(pnt + b->uncompressed_siz); */
vztint32_t *val_tmp;
unsigned int num_bitplanes;
uintptr_t padskip;
[10] num_time_ticks = vzt_rd_get_v32(&pnt);
/* fprintf(stderr, "* num_time_ticks = %d\n", num_time_ticks); */
if (num_time_ticks != 0) {
vztint64_t cur_time;
[11] times = malloc(num_time_ticks * sizeof(vztint64_t));
[12] times[0] = cur_time = vzt_rd_get_v64(&pnt);
for (i = 1; i < num_time_ticks; i++) {
vztint64_t delta = vzt_rd_get_v64(&pnt);
cur_time += delta;
[12] times[i] = cur_time;
}
} else {
vztint64_t cur_time = b->start;
[13] num_time_ticks = b->end - b->start + 1;
[14] times = malloc(num_time_ticks * sizeof(vztint64_t));
for (i = 0; i < num_time_ticks; i++) {
[15] times[i] = cur_time++;
}
}
At [9] pnt is set to point to the decompressed block data.
At [10] num_time_ticks is extracted as a 32-bit varint from pnt.
At this point we reach two identical issues that we’re describing separately. However, keep in mind that in both cases, as num_time_ticks is 32-bit, this issue only affects 32-bit mode.
Moreover, note that the decompression code can happen in threads, and GTKWave itself is a multi-threaded application. For these reasons, depending on the threading and heap implementations, writing out-of-bounds in the decompression thread may lead to corrupting a thread nearby, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution.
If num_time_ticks is not 0, its value is used to allocate the times array, as num_time_ticks represents the number of time values that are expected to be found in the block. The size calculation for this allocation can, however, overflow in 32-bit mode, with any number of num_time_ticks >= 0x20000000. Later on, the times array is filled with 64-bit varints read from file, for num_time_ticks times. However, as [11] may have allocated an overly small buffer, the writes at [12] may write out-of-bounds in the heap, leading to memory corruption.
Similarly, if num_time_ticks is 0, the number of times is taken by calculating the difference between start and end times [13], defined right before the compressed section of the block. We then have the same integer overflow [14], and subsequent writes [15] may be out-of-bounds, leading to memory corruption.
==401211==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0xf5e00350 at pc 0x565587b8 bp 0xffffd488 sp 0xffffd47c
WRITE of size 8 at 0xf5e00350 thread T0
#0 0x565587b7 in vzt_rd_block_vch_decode src/helpers/vzt_read.c:347
#1 0x5655ca7a in vzt_rd_process_block src/helpers/vzt_read.c:817
#2 0x565619d4 in vzt_rd_iter_blocks src/helpers/vzt_read.c:1513
#3 0x5656c5fc in process_vzt src/helpers/vzt2vcd.c:299
#4 0x5656cf15 in main src/helpers/vzt2vcd.c:464
#5 0xf7611294 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#6 0xf7611357 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:381
#7 0x565574f6 in _start (vzt2vcd+0x24f6)
0xf5e00351 is located 0 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0xf5e00350,0xf5e00351)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0xf7a55ffb in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 0x565586f8 in vzt_rd_block_vch_decode src/helpers/vzt_read.c:343
#2 0x5655ca7a in vzt_rd_process_block src/helpers/vzt_read.c:817
#3 0x565619d4 in vzt_rd_iter_blocks src/helpers/vzt_read.c:1513
#4 0x5656c5fc in process_vzt src/helpers/vzt2vcd.c:299
#5 0x5656cf15 in main src/helpers/vzt2vcd.c:464
#6 0xf7611294 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow src/helpers/vzt_read.c:347 in vzt_rd_block_vch_decode
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x3ebc0010: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x3ebc0020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x3ebc0030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x3ebc0040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x3ebc0050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x3ebc0060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[01]fa fa fa 04 fa
0x3ebc0070: fa fa fd fa fa fa 00 05 fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa
0x3ebc0080: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fa
0x3ebc0090: fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 05
0x3ebc00a0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 04 fa
0x3ebc00b0: fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa fa fa 04 fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Fixed in version 3.3.118, available from https://sourceforge.net/projects/gtkwave/files/gtkwave-3.3.118/
2023-08-02 - Vendor Disclosure
2023-12-31 - Vendor Patch Release
2024-01-08 - Public Release
Discovered by Claudio Bozzato of Cisco Talos.