Talos Vulnerability Report

SUMMARY

An out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in the EMF functionality of Canva Affinity. By using a specially crafted EMF file, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to perform an out-of-bounds read, potentially leading to the disclosure of sensitive information.

CONFIRMED VULNERABLE VERSIONS

The versions below were either tested or verified to be vulnerable by Talos or confirmed to be vulnerable by the vendor.

Canva Affinity 3.0.1.3808

PRODUCT URLS

Affinity - https://www.affinity.studio/

CVSSv3 SCORE

6.1 - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L

CWE

CWE-125 - Out-of-bounds Read

DETAILS

Affinity is a professional and versatile suite of creative applications designed for graphic design, photo editing, and desktop publishing. It provides a fast, streamlined experience with powerful tools to create illustrations, edit images, and design print or digital layouts. The suite is widely regarded as a capable and affordable alternative the software like Adobe Creative Cloud.

Affinity applications support the EMF file format, and this vulnerability is associated with how EMF files are processed.

An EMF (Enhanced Metafile Format) file stores images in a device-independent form. It begins with a header (EMR_HEADER) that contains information about the structure and contents of the metafile. The structure of the EMR_HEADER is as follows:

Offset      Size      Name
------      ---- --------------------------------------
0x00        0x04            recordType  (0x00000001 )
0x04        0x04            recordSize
0x08        0x10            bounds
0x18        0x10            frame
0x28        0x04            recordSignature (0x464D4520)
0x2C        0x04            version
0x30        0x04            sizeInBytes
0x34        0x04            numOfRecords
0x38        0x02            Handles
0x3A        0x02            Reserved

Please note that the structure of EMR_HEADER shown is not complete; it only includes the relevant fields.

For the EMR_HEADER record, the recordType must be 0x00000001. The recordSize indicates the total size of the header record in bytes. The recordSignature field defines the record signature, which must have the value 0x464D4520 (FME ). The sizeInBytes field specifies the size of the metafile in bytes. The numOfRecords indicates the total number of records present in the metafile, including the EMR_HEADER.

This vulnerability is associated with the record type EMR_POLYPOLYLINE16.

The EMR_POLYPOLYLINE16 record specifies multiple series of connected line segments. Its structure is defined as follows:

Offset     Size      Name
-----   ---------- --------------------------------------
0x00         0x04        recordType  (0x0000005A   )
0x04         0x04        recordSize
0x08         0x10        Bounds
0x18         0x04        NumberOfPolylines (p)
0x1C         0x04        Count (n)
0x20         0x04*p      PolylinePointCount
0x20+(4*p)   0x04*n      aPoints 

For the EMR_POLYPOLYLINE16 record, the recordType value must be 0x0000005A. The Count field specifies the number of PointS objects in the aPoints field. The aPoints field is an array whose size is equal to Count.

This vulnerability occurs when the value of (0x20 + (4 * p) + (4 * n)) exceeds recordSize. When this condition is met, an out‑of‑bounds read can occur during access to the aPoints array. This behavior can be observed while debugging with pageheap enabled.

0:032> g
Breakpoint 1 hit
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c0e:
00007ffa`4ef17d8e 4c8bea          mov     r13,rdx
0:032> r
rax=00007ffa5d93ada0 rbx=000001d6d4830118 rcx=00000020aa9ff390
rdx=000001d6d4830118 rsi=000001d992662d20 rdi=00000020aa9ff2d0
rip=00007ffa4ef17d8e rsp=00000020aa9fefe0 rbp=00000020aa9ff060
 r8=000001d9bf154ff0  r9=0000000000000002 r10=0000000000000000
r11=00000020aa9fef60 r12=00007ffa4ef1fe80 r13=000001d6d4830000
r14=0000000000000001 r15=0000000000000000
iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000202
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c0e:
00007ffa`4ef17d8e 4c8bea          mov     r13,rdx
0:032> dd 000001d6d4830118    ;<------------------------------------- (1)
000001d6`d4830118  0000005a 00000060 0000005e 00000252
000001d6`d4830128  0000038a 0000057e 00000003 0055000d
000001d6`d4830138  00000005 00000004 00000004 00000000
000001d6`d4830148  00140064 00640014 ffe0ff6a 00000000
000001d6`d4830158  012c012c ffa60046 0064ffb0 012c012c
000001d6`d4830168  01900190 0190fe70 fe70fe70 01900190
000001d6`d4830178  00000025 0000000c 80000007 00000028
000001d6`d4830188  0000000c 00000001 0000000e 00000014
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c11:
00007ffa`4ef17d91 e83a97ffff      call    libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x43350 (00007ffa`4ef114d0)
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c16:
00007ffa`4ef17d96 0f57c0          xorps   xmm0,xmm0
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c19:
00007ffa`4ef17d99 f30f7f45c8      movdqu  xmmword ptr [rbp-38h],xmm0 ss:00000020`aa9ff028=000001d9949e6fd000007ffa4ef0dd98
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49c1e:
00007ffa`4ef17d9e 4533e4          xor     r12d,r12d

[...]

0:032> g
Breakpoint 3 hit
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ee0:
00007ffa`4ef18060 4c8d248520000000 lea     r12,[rax*4+20h]
0:032> r
rax=0000000000000003 rbx=000001d9d5cf0f20 rcx=000001d9db1f0ff0
rdx=0000000000000000 rsi=000001d9d5cf0f20 rdi=000001d9bbcd6ffc
rip=00007ffa4ef18060 rsp=00000020aa9fefe0 rbp=00000020aa9ff060
 r8=000001d9bbcd6ffc  r9=3fffffffffffffff r10=00007ffafa1d0000
r11=000001d9d5cf0f00 r12=0000000000000003 r13=000001d6d4830118
r14=000001d9bbcd6ff0 r15=000001d6d4830144
iopl=0         nv up ei pl zr na po nc
cs=0033  ss=002b  ds=002b  es=002b  fs=0053  gs=002b             efl=00000246
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ee0:
00007ffa`4ef18060 4c8d248520000000 lea     r12,[rax*4+20h] ;<------------------------- (2)
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ee8:
00007ffa`4ef18068 4d03e5          add     r12,r13 ;<------------------------- (3)
0:032> dd 000001d6d4830118
000001d6`d4830118  0000005a 00000060 0000005e 00000252
000001d6`d4830128  0000038a 0000057e 00000003 0055000d
000001d6`d4830138  00000005 00000004 00000004 00000000
000001d6`d4830148  00140064 00640014 ffe0ff6a 00000000
000001d6`d4830158  012c012c ffa60046 0064ffb0 012c012c
000001d6`d4830168  01900190 0190fe70 fe70fe70 01900190
000001d6`d4830178  00000025 0000000c 80000007 00000028
000001d6`d4830188  0000000c 00000001 0000000e 00000014
0:032> t
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49eeb:
00007ffa`4ef1806b 4533ed          xor     r13d,r13d
0:032> t
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49eee:
00007ffa`4ef1806e 488b4548        mov     rax,qword ptr [rbp+48h] ss:00000020`aa9ff0a8=000001d6d4830118
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ef2:
00007ffa`4ef18072 4439681c        cmp     dword ptr [rax+1Ch],r13d ds:000001d6`d4830134=0055000d  ;<------------------------- (4)
0:032> p
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ef6:
00007ffa`4ef18076 0f8683010000    jbe     libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x4a07f (00007ffa`4ef181ff) [br=0]
0:032> u
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49ef6:
00007ffa`4ef18076 0f8683010000    jbe     libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x4a07f (00007ffa`4ef181ff)
00007ffa`4ef1807c 49b8ffffffffffffff0f mov r8,0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFh
00007ffa`4ef18086 66660f1f840000000000 nop word ptr [rax+rax]
00007ffa`4ef18090 410fbf442402    movsx   eax,word ptr [r12+2] ;<------------------------- (5)
00007ffa`4ef18096 660f6ef0        movd    xmm6,eax
00007ffa`4ef1809a f30fe6f6        cvtdq2pd xmm6,xmm6
00007ffa`4ef1809e 410fbf0424      movsx   eax,word ptr [r12]  ;<------------------------- (6)
00007ffa`4ef180a3 660f6ef8        movd    xmm7,eax

The contents of the EMR_POLYPOLYLINE16 record are examined at (1). The rax register at (2) contains the NumberOfPolylines, which is used to calculate the offset of the aPoints field. This offset is added to the buffer containing the EMR_POLYPOLYLINE16 record to obtain the address of aPoints. A loop begins at (4) that runs Count times and reads PointS objects at (5) and (6). In this case, the Count value is excessively large, and continuing the loop leads to an out‑of‑bounds read, which is visible at the time of the crash.

0:032> g
(1318.1270): Access violation - code c0000005 (first chance)
First chance exceptions are reported before any exception handling.
This exception may be expected and handled.
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49f10:
00007ffa`4ef18090 410fbf442402    movsx   eax,word ptr [r12+2] ds:000001d6`d4831002=????

0:032> dd 000001d6`d4831002
000001d6`d4831002  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831012  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831022  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831032  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831042  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831052  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831062  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????
000001d6`d4831072  ???????? ???????? ???????? ????????

0:032> u
libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49f10:
00007ffa`4ef18090 410fbf442402    movsx   eax,word ptr [r12+2]
00007ffa`4ef18096 660f6ef0        movd    xmm6,eax
00007ffa`4ef1809a f30fe6f6        cvtdq2pd xmm6,xmm6
00007ffa`4ef1809e 410fbf0424      movsx   eax,word ptr [r12]
00007ffa`4ef180a3 660f6ef8        movd    xmm7,eax
00007ffa`4ef180a7 f30fe6ff        cvtdq2pd xmm7,xmm7
00007ffa`4ef180ab 4c8bf3          mov     r14,rbx
00007ffa`4ef180ae 483bd9          cmp     rbx,rcx

0:032> kb
 # RetAddr               : Args to Child                                                           : Call Site
00 00007ffa`4ef20f0f     : 00000020`aa9ff390 000001d6`d4830118 000001d9`beb8efd0 000001d6`d4830118 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x49f10
01 00007ffa`4ef1fe9c     : 00000020`aa9ff390 00000000`00000118 00000000`0000000f 000021d8`00000004 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x52d8f
02 00007ffa`faf0e73f     : 00000000`00000118 000001d9`92662d20 000001d6`af810000 000001d6`af810000 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x51d1c
03 00007ffa`fc56d432     : 000001d9`a5904fd0 00000020`00000000 000001d9`a5904fd0 00000000`00000000 : gdi32full!bInternalPlayEMF+0x250bf
04 00007ffa`4ef215ce     : 00000000`00000000 00000020`aa9ff3f0 00000020`aa9ff670 000001d9`b7dd4f90 : GDI32!EnumEnhMetaFileStub+0x52
05 00007ffa`4eecdb56     : 00000020`aa9ff390 00000020`aa9ff320 00000000`00000000 00007ffa`fd881910 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x5344e
06 00007ffa`4eece041     : 000001d9`b7dd4f90 000001d9`92662d20 000001d9`b7dd4f90 00000020`aa9ff670 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x86
07 00007ffa`4eece2ab     : 00000020`aa9ff708 000001d9`b7dd4f90 00000020`aa9ff670 00000020`aa9ff720 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x101
08 00007ffa`4eece124     : 000001d6`8e5c3740 00000020`aa9ff708 00000020`aa9ff6d8 00000020`aa9ff751 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x12b
09 00007ffa`4ec83a94     : 000001d9`b1ea4fb0 000001d6`8e5c3740 00000020`aa9ff7b0 00000020`aa9ffa78 : libpersona!Emf::EmfLoader::LoadDocument+0x94
0a 00007ffa`4ec5088f     : 000001d6`8e5c3740 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`ffffff00 : libpersona!DocumentController::TryLoadEMF+0xc4
0b 00007ffa`4ec4eacc     : 00000000`00000000 000001d9`00000001 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : libpersona!DocumentController::LoadDocumentI+0xfaf
0c 00007ffa`51283602     : 000001d9`897a6690 00000000`00000000 000001d9`85784f70 00000000`00000000 : libpersona!DocumentController::LoadDocument+0x8c
0d 00007ffa`52a96cea     : 000001d9`897a66c8 000001d9`c05a0f00 00007ffa`af8c2800 00000000`00000000 : libpersona!LoadDocumentCommand::Do+0x252
0e 00007ffa`af2464cf     : 00000000`00000000 000001d9`85784f70 00000000`00000000 000001d9`b5d0cfe0 : libpersona!PersonaController::StaticDoCommand+0x3a
0f 00007ffa`af49f47f     : 000001d9`a777cfd0 00000000`00000481 00000000`00000000 000001d9`a8c3ef90 : libkernel!Kernel::InSerialiserPropertyDataStream::LoadValues+0xb787f
10 00007ffa`fcc17374     : 00007ffa`af8c2800 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : libkernel!Kernel::InSerialiserPropertyDataStream::LoadValues+0x31082f
11 00007ffa`fd87cc91     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : KERNEL32!BaseThreadInitThunk+0x14
12 00000000`00000000     : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x21

0:032> lmDvm libpersona
Browse full module list
start             end                 module name
00007ffa`49180000 00007ffa`60abb000   libpersona   (export symbols)       C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Canva.Affinity_3.0.1.3808_x64__8a0j1tnjnt4a4\App\libpersona.dll
    Loaded symbol image file: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Canva.Affinity_3.0.1.3808_x64__8a0j1tnjnt4a4\App\libpersona.dll
    Image path: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Canva.Affinity_3.0.1.3808_x64__8a0j1tnjnt4a4\App\libpersona.dll
    Image name: libpersona.dll
    Browse all global symbols  functions  data  Symbol Reload
    Timestamp:        Mon Nov  3 07:34:40 2025 (6908CB90)
    CheckSum:         17822078
    ImageSize:        1793B000
    Mapping Form:     Loaded
    Translations:     0000.04b0 0000.04e4 0409.04b0 0409.04e4
    Information from resource tables:

Exploiting this vulnerability allows for the reading of arbitrary memory within the process, potentially disclosing sensitive information.

VENDOR RESPONSE

See security bulletin on trust.canva.com with the vulnerability details and vulnerable versions. (URL to advisory: https://trust.canva.com/?tcuUid=1f728b0d-17f3-4c9c-97e9-6662b769eb62)

TIMELINE

2026-01-27 - Vendor Disclosure
2026-03-17 - Vendor Patch Release
2026-03-17 - Public Release